Continuing Red Flags: 85,000 “Purged” Voters Still Recorded as Voting in New York
by Floyd Patrick, Project CIVICA Data Analyst and Kim Hermance, President and Co-Director Project CIVICA.
March 2026 Election Integrity Snapshot Raises Serious Questions About Voter Roll Accuracy
New York’s voter rolls are massive, complex, and legally required to be accurate, auditable, and continuously maintained. But the latest March 2026 Election Integrity Score Sheet reveals a set of anomalies that demand closer scrutiny—none more concerning than this:
85,469 voters are recorded as having voted after their purge date.
This is not a marginal discrepancy. It is a structural red flag.
If voter records are being marked as removed—whether due to death, relocation, or other lawful reasons—those individuals should not subsequently appear in the voting history. When they do, it raises a fundamental question:
Is the system accurately maintaining voter eligibility—or accurately recording voter activity?
The Scale of the System
Before examining the anomalies, it is important to understand the size of the dataset:
13.59 million active voters
940,960 inactive voters
Over 10 million voters previously purged
In just the last month:
34,609 voters were added
27,701 voters were removed
This is not a static system—it is a constantly shifting database that requires precision and consistency to comply with federal law, including the National Voter Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act.
The Most Alarming Finding: “Purged, But Voted”
The presence of 85,469 individuals recorded as voting after being purged represents one of the most serious integrity signals in the dataset.
There are only a few possible explanations:
Data integrity failure (records not synchronized or updated correctly)
Improper or premature purge classifications
Delayed or inconsistent vote-history updates
Audit trail deficiencies that prevent verification of changes
None of these explanations are benign.
Under federal law, statewide voter databases must be accurate, uniform, and auditable. If a voter’s status can change without a clear, traceable sequence of events—or if vote history appears or disappears without explanation—the system fails the basic test of auditability.
And without auditability, there is no way to independently verify outcomes.
Compounding Irregularities
The “purged-but-voted” issue does not exist in isolation. It sits within a broader pattern of anomalies:
Duplicate and Cross-State Registrations
145,378 in-state duplicates
86,171 NY/NJ duplicates
12,618 NY/Florida duplicates
Duplicate registrations are not inherently illegal—but they must be reconciled. Failure to do so creates the risk of duplicate voting, inaccurate voter counts, and administrative confusion across jurisdictions.
Voters Who Have Left—but Remain Registered
247,602 voters identified as having moved out of state but still on New York rolls
Under the NVRA, states are required to conduct reasonable list maintenance using tools like the National Change of Address (NCOA) system. A number of this magnitude suggests either:
Delays in processing interstate moves, or
Insufficient cross-state coordination
Both scenarios undermine confidence in roll accuracy.
Suspected Deceased Voters Still Active
16,394 suspected deceased voters listed as active
This category is particularly sensitive. While “suspected” does not mean confirmed, the presence of such records underscores the importance of timely death record matching and removal protocols.
Long-Term Non-Voting Registrants
1.73 million voters who have not voted in the last two federal elections
1.19 million who have not voted in 5+ years
Federal law is clear: voters cannot be removed solely for inactivity. However, these figures highlight the need for proper confirmation notice processes and consistent maintenance cycles.
Other Data Integrity Flags
1,036 duplicate SBOEID numbers
506 voters registered at postal addresses
2,946 active voters with irregular birthdates
1 registrant under age 16
Individually, some of these may appear minor. Collectively, they indicate systemic data quality challenges.
Why This Matters
Election integrity is not determined by rhetoric or assumptions—it is determined by data integrity, transparency, and compliance with law.
The NVRA requires that voter list maintenance be:
Continuous
Uniform
Nondiscriminatory
HAVA requires that statewide databases be:
Accurate
Centralized
Auditable
The anomalies identified in this snapshot—particularly the 85,469 “purged-but-voted” records—raise legitimate questions about whether those standards are being met consistently.
The Bottom Line
This dataset does not prove widespread wrongdoing. But it does reveal something equally important:
A system where critical data points conflict with one another—and where those conflicts cannot be easily explained or audited.
That is not a political issue.
That is a data integrity issue.
And ultimately, it is a public trust issue.
What Comes Next
These findings point to the need for:
Enhanced audit trails within the statewide voter database
Improved cross-state data sharing and reconciliation
Transparent reporting of list maintenance activity
Independent review of anomalies such as “purged-but-voted” records
Election systems do not need to be perfect—but they must be verifiable.
Without verifiability, confidence erodes.
And when confidence erodes, participation—and trust in outcomes—follows.